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Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of the importance of collective action for the realization of Natural 
Resource Management (NRM) investments and its effect on community-level efficiency in the provision of 
NRM investments. This study is based on survey data collected in 2002 in 78 villages of northeastern 
Burkina Faso. The general cooperative capacity of each community is first recovered for any type of 
collective activity and is then used to explain the probability of a community undertaking reforestation 
activities and/or stone bunds construction, as well as to explain the efficiency level in the realization of 
those investments. Empirical results show that greater cooperative capacity indeed increases the likelihood 
of NRM investments to be undertaken at the community level; however, greater cooperative capacity also 
appears to lead to inefficient provision of these public goods.       
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The northeast of Burkina Faso is a dry region where crop and livestock activities 
are strongly integrated. In such systems, there is wide scope for collective action and 
cooperation to influence land use and allocation patterns between private cropland and 
common rangeland, and to promote investments and management of community 
resources. With current trends of population pressure and land degradation, households 
increasingly have greater incentives to actively manage their natural resources, but at the 
same time, transactions costs of doing so tend to increase, at least as the population 
grows. 
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There is a wide range of activities that can be undertaken at the community level 
in order to enhance the productivity and resilience of the natural resource base.  For 
instance, community members may invest in water-point construction and maintenance, 
make agro-forestry investments, engage in bush clearing, or invest in water harvesting 
and soil erosion control measures.  Each technique, management tool, or activity, will be 
characterized by different collective action requirements, and will also be characterized 
by different structure of costs and benefits that will affect individual incentives to engage 
in collective action.  For instance, soil erosion control techniques, such as the 
construction of stone bunds, generally entail collective labor for their construction, but 
can be constructed either on private cropland or common pastures.  If constructed on 
common pastures, benefits are shared amongst those who use pasture resources, whereas 
if they are constructed on private cropland, the individual realizes private gains, though 
there there are usually spillover benefits to the community as a whole in terms of reduced 
soil erosion. At the same time, each community will have different capacities for 
undertaking collective action, irrespective of any particular activity, and this capacity will 
also affect the degree of successfulness in these activities.  In turn, we hypothesize that 
the effectiveness with which these decisions are implemented will have a direct impact 
on both short-term profitability and long-term sustainability of alternative production 
activities.   
Thus, our focus in this paper is on community’s capacity to cooperate, on 
developing indicators of this capacity, and then using these indicators to examine the 
impact of cooperative capacity on the public goods investments decision; given data 
collected, we consider decisions to construct stone bunds, and in engaging in 
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reforestation activities.  However, to get a better idea of the “effectiveness” of collective 
action to engage in reforestation and/or stone bunds, we also consider a measure of the 
efficiency of participation by community members in these activities.  We do so by using 
a stochastic frontier estimation of reforestation and stone bund construction, and then 
determining which factors, including cooperative capacity, affect the level of efficiency 
in the provision of these investments. 
 
 
2. The model  
 
As discussed above, in this paper, we decompose community’s decisions on erosion 
control and/or reforestation into two steps: first, the community agrees on whether or not 
to undertake an activity and then, they determine how much to reforest and/or how much 
soil erosion to actually do.   
 
2.1. A binary decision 
The first step is a binary decision, undertake or not reforestation or stone bunds 
construction. Empirically, 50% of interviewed communities were engaged in the 
construction of stone bunds in 2002, and 41% in reforestation (32% engaged in both 
activities, while 41% in neither). We hypothesize that these decisions are mainly 
dependent on the cooperative capacity of a community, and on the presence of a project 
promoting those activities through financial and technical support.  Several other factors 
will also affect this decision, including human capital, land scarcity, a measure of 
whether benefits accrue to community members or to non-members as well, a measure of 
the opportunity cost of household labor, and measures of expected benefits and costs; we 
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discuss each of these in turn below.  But first, we specify the investment relationship in 
equation [1] below: 
Ero / Ref  = f(AC ; PSB-GTZ ; Educ ; LM; Crop ; Strang ; Mig ; Water)        [1] 
Ero = Probability of a village to be involved in stone bunds construction. 
Ref = Probability of a village to be involved in reforestation.  
AC  = Cooperative capacity of the community  
PSB-GTZ = Period the village works with the PSB/GTZ. 
Educ = % of adults with education (public or alphabetization in local language) 
LM = Existence of land market in the village 
Crop = % cropped land 
Strang = % of the population cropping seasonally on the village land. 
Mig = % household with long term migration. 
Water = Water points in the village (only for reforestation) 
 
Indicators of cooperative capacity constructed in the next section are expected to have 
a positive impact on the decision to undertake both activities.  An NGO (locally based but 
supported with international donor funds), the Programme Sahelian Burkinabe supported 
by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (PSB/GTZ), is the 
main project acting in the surveyed zone, and has been operating since the beginning of 
the 80’s (75% of surveyed villages have been working with PSB/GTZ).  There have been 
three distinct conceptual frameworks guiding project implementation until now. Before 
1996, the project had an overwhelming focus on technical solutions to crop production 
and an NRM focus on specific resources within given boundaries (the latter referred to as 
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the “terroir” approach). Projects starting after 1996 expanded on the “terroir” approach to 
consider the system as a whole, including community members’ use of non-community 
resources and vice-versa.  In 2000, emphasis within PSB/GTZ program sharpened the 
focus on conflict management. Whereas the presence of PSB/GTZ is expected to increase 
a community’s decision to engage in reforestation and/or soil erosion control, dummies 
capturing the different time period when the project began working in a community are 
constructed to allow for different “project paradigms” to have a differential impact on 
community participation in these activities – with “no PSB/GTZ” being the omitted 
category. 
The proportion of households having at least one adult with some education – 
public education or alphabetization in local language - is expected to increase the 
likelihood that these activities are undertaken, both because greater education should lead 
to enhanced capacity to understand the need for collective action given the 
interdependencies involved in public goods provision, and because the “school” is often 
used as a meeting place by alumni and current parents to plan collective activities.   
The presence of a land market in the village reveals a certain degree of land 
scarcity.  The creation of a land market presumes greater tenure security, and to the 
extent this is true, landowners should be more willing to invest in productivity improving 
technologies (Meizen-Dick, 2002), particularly on private croplands. Similarly, we 
hypothesize that villages whose land is mostly allocated to cropping activities are more 
likely to undertake the stone bunds/reforestation investments than those with a greater 
specialization in livestock production, since we expect that returns to soil erosion control 
will be relatively greater for crops than for livestock. 
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The presence of ‘outsiders’ in the village implies that such outsiders might benefit 
from soil erosion control measures but are unlikely to bear any costs associated with  
providing these measures; to capture this potential impact, we use the proportion of crop 
farmers that are not settled in the village but who crop on borrowed land. Higher 
opportunity costs of labor dedicated to constructing bunds or reforesting is expected to 
reduce the likelihood of undertaking such measures; given rather thin local labor markets, 
however, establishing this opportunity cost is difficult to do directly.  Instead, we use the 
proportion of households with at least one member engaged in long-term migration. 
Finally, in the case of reforestation, we expect that villages with greater water 
infrastructure (number of water points such as forages, well, pounds) are more likely to 
engage in reforestation, since water is the main constraint for trees to survive and thus 
costs of reforesting should be lower. The largest non-labor costs associated with 
constructing stone bunds are related to transporting stones; we expect that villages where 
PSB/GTZ is operating face lower costs of finding sources for stones and in transporting 
them back to the village, as PSB project personnel actively support this activity.  In other 
words, we do not have a separate proxy for costs of constructing stone bunds; rather, we 
expect villages with a PSB/GTZ presence to be more likely to engage in stone bunds or 
reforestation both because of its emphasis on NRM more generally, and because in such 
villages, costs of constructing stone bunds should be lower. 
 
2.2. Efficiency in the provision of NRM technologies  
Once the village members agree to engage in an activity, the next decision is how 
much reforestation or stone bund construction to undertake; this results in the expected 
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outcome (planned reforestation, bund construction) and input demand (monetary or labor 
contributions by members1).  At the same time, we would like know whether or not the 
group is efficient at providing reforested areas or stone bunds.  We thus derive a measure 
of the degree of inefficiency, and then use exogenous community characteristics to 
explain this degree of inefficiency, including the capacity of the community to cooperate. 
First, we build a stochastic frontier model to estimate the technical efficiency2 of 
communities in the construction of stone bunds and in reforestation. 
Suppose, the community has a production function ( )β;iwf  and, if all were 
efficient, the community would produce ( )β;iwfInv = , where wi, is labor provided by 
community members, β  is the shifter in production, and Invi is the level of NRM 
investment provided. In the case of reforestation, Inv represents the number of trees 
planted, and in the case of stone bunds, the number of hectares treated by stone bunds. 
Additionally, constructing stone bunds is often undertaken in conjunction with other 
investments whose purpose is to increase productivity, such as improved traditional 
planting pits (zai), manure application, or mulching (paillage). These technologies are 
complementary and, in practice, it is simply not possible to decompose labor allocation 
between each technology, stone bunds included. Therefore, we built a composite variable 
called Improved bunds, which is equal to the area treated by stone bunds, weighted by an 
index aggregating the percentage of this land treated with complementary technologies3.  
                                                 
1 We observe only few cases of monetary contribution (2 cases for the reforestation and 4 cases for stone 
bunds construction), therefore monetary participation has not be taken into account in the following 
analysis. 
2 Since as we will see later, the production function is defined with a single input , we are not interested in 
measuring allocative efficiency. 
3 This index has been built using a factor analysis. 
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Allowing for the possibility of inefficiency, we can re-write the producers’ 
production function as follows: Invi ( ) iiwf ξβ;= , where iξ is the level of efficiency for 
community i ( iξ =1 if the community achieves the optimal output , iξ <1 otherwise). On 
the other hand, output is also subject to random shocks, iv , that are not controllable by 
the community:  Invi ( ) ivii ewf ξβ;= . Taking the natural log of both side yields: 
 Ln(Invi) = iii uvw −++ )ln(0 ββ        [2] 
where )ln( iiu ξ−= is the degree of technical inefficiency. 
 
2.3. Explaining efficiency level in the provision of NRM technologies  
From the above analysis, we can derive a measure of inefficiency for each community, 
)ln( iiu ξ−= .  We are then interested in determining what factors affect the degree of 
efficiency; as captured in eq. [3] below: 
iξ = g(AC/Particip; PSB-GTZ; Educ; LM ; Strang ; Mig; Expe; Water/Distance)     [3] 
AC  = Cooperative capacity of the community  
Particip = Participation rate of community members  
PSB-GTZ = Activity supported by PSB/GTZ, vs. other projects. 
Educ = % of adults with education (public or alphabetization in local language) 
LM = Existence of land market in the village. 
Strang = % of the population cropping seasonally on the village land. 
Mig = % household with long term migration. 
Expe = Past experience in activity 
Water = Water points in the village (only for reforestation) 
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First, we are interested in observing the impact of cooperative capacity and the 
participation rate on the degree of inefficiency in communities that reforest or construct 
stone bunds.  However, both variables cannot enter the same regression equation, since 
they are endogenously related; i.e., higher cooperative capacity induces greater 
participation in a specific activity.  We thus show results for two specifications, each 
using one or the other variable.  We hypothesize that in communities with a greater 
capacity to cooperate, or a higher participation rate in the activity under study, will be 
more efficient in producing the public good.  
The project supporting the activity may also influence inefficiency; thus we include 
the PSB-GTZ variables described above. Furthermore, we expect that previous 
experience in providing the good, i.e. previous area treated for soil erosion, and number 
of years community members have engaged in reforestation activities, is expected to have 
a positive impact on efficiency (or alternatively, a negative impact on inefficiency).  
Greater water infrastructure, used to proxying costs of accessing water, is not only 
expected to increase the area planted, but also to increase efficiency since timing of water 
applications is thought to be critically important, particularly for very young trees.  
Finally, we expect education, land market, the presence of outsiders, extent of long-
distance migration, to have similar effects on efficiency that they have on the decision to 
undertake the activity.  
Because we only observe the efficiency level of communities that undertake the 
activity only, and we expect that the communities that did not engage in the activity are 
likely to also be those that are less efficient, we suppose a selection bias that will cause 
the overestimation of the efficiency level.  In order to correct for this potential bias, we 
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calculate the inverse Mills ratio, computed from the selection equation, and use this as a 
regressor in the inefficiency equations.  
 
3. Data collection 
Data were collected in 78 communities in the Seno and Oudalan regions of 
Burkina Faso in the summer 2002. An institutional questionnaire was administered 
collectively to the village leader, representatives of the major NRM institutions and other 
key informants.  Three broad types of data were collected.  First, a census was taken of 
all institutions (e.g. the chief) and organizations in charge of any aspect of NRM, and 
detailed information was recorded regarding the structure of management, how the 
organization was created and who/what group began the organization, the number of 
members, frequency of meetings and attendance at those meetings, etc.  This section was 
followed by an enumeration of all activities related to NRM in the community with 
detailed information on the activities, the institution or organizations responsible, 
methods of monitoring and enforcing participation, and actual participation rates. This 
part of the survey was structured to gather information by resource: common pastures, 
water sources, soil, and tree resources. The final section of the survey gathered 
information on rules and regulations, following a similar format to that for the activities 
section. 
Data on the main characteristics of the community were also collected in a 
community-level questionnaire, such as basic demographic data (number of households 
by ethnicity, number of female-headed households, number of quarters (define quarters) 
within the village, etc.), herd demography and mobility, community infrastructure, and 
 11
identification of major markets used by community members. In addition, aerial 
photographs were used to construct resource maps for each community, and to identify 
community boundaries – including identification of areas over which resources were 
shared with other communities. Boundary coordinates were also obtained with GPS units. 
Resource maps included information on land use and soil types, key resources such as 
water points and sand dunes, and the location of the village, hamlets and roads.   
 
 
4. Measuring the cooperative capacity 
 
The level of cooperative capacity in a community is not directly observable, and 
we must therefore construct a proxy measure of such capacity.  Thus, our purpose in this 
section is to aggregate several indicators of collective action using a factor analysis 
(McCarthy et al, 2002) in order to arrive at proxy measures of cooperative capacity.  
These indicators can be regrouped into two sets of variables. The density of organizations 
and the participation rates by households in these organizations reflect the capacity to 
share information and facilitate the transformation of information into knowledge and 
action. The second set of variables includes the frequency of and attendance at meetings, 
the number of rules and regulations devised and activities undertaken, and whether or not 
labor contributions are made. These characteristics are thought to reflect the capacity of 
the community to translate “social capital” into concrete action, which bears a 
relationship with the concept of “agency” as discussed in Krishna (2002).  
More specifically, the variables used in the factor analysis to recover cooperative 
capacity are as follows: 
• NRM Network:  Number of NRM institutions/organizations per household 
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• NRM Membership:  Percent of households that are members of NRM 
institution/organizations, averaged over all NRM institutions, multiplied by the 
number of these organizations 
• Non-NRM Network: Number of non-NRM institutions/organizations per 
household (i.e.. women’s groups) 
• Meetings:  Number of meetings held per year, averaged over all NRM 
organizations  
• Average Meetings Participation Rate:  We asked how many households “usually” 
attended meetings; this number was used to create the percent of households 
attending meetings for each institution, and a variable was constructed of the 
average of this percent across organizations.   
• Activities: Total number of activities observed for all NRM organizations 
• Rules: Total number of rules observed for all NRM organizations 
• Average number of workdays allocated to collective activities, per member 
• Average Activities Participation Rate:  As with the meetings variable, the percent 
of households “usually” participating was constructed, and an average was taken 
across organizations. 
 
Because these variables are strongly correlated, but no one variable is thought to 
adequately capture the cooperative capacity of a community, we have aggregated the 
variables into indices based on a factor analysis. Results of the factor analysis for the first 
two factors, which had eigenvalues greater than one, are presented below.  
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       First Factor     Second Factor 
Eigenvalue:  2.12   1.73 
Cumulative:  .52     .95 
 
To highlight scoring coefficients with strong loadings, we have put those with 
coefficients greater than |.1| in bold.  Looking at the first factor in table 1, we note that the 
scoring coefficients are relatively high and positive for the network and membership 
variables and to a lesser extent on percent of members who actually contribute labor and 
number of activities, but coefficients are relatively low for participation in meetings, and 
activities, total number of rules and of days worked. Given these scoring coefficients, we 
hereafter refer to this factor as the indicator of network capacity (INC). 
 
Table 1. Scoring coefficients for the first two factors 
Variables INC IIC 
Network NRM 0.32 -0.19 
Network others 0.08 -0.01 
Membership NRM 0.51 -0.23 
# meetings -0.04 0.08 
Participation meeting 0.02 0.08 
# Activities 0.16 0.28 
# Rules 0.01 0.03 
# Days of work 0.05 0.15 
Participation in work 0.18 0.46 
 
In contrast, scoring coefficients for the second factor are strong and positive for 
most of the variables measuring active participation –number of activities, participation 
in activities and the number of days worked. The coefficients for density and membership 
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in organizations are actually negative on this index.  Given the heavier weight on 
variables associated with making and implementing decisions, we hereafter refer to this 
factor as the indicator of implementation capacity (IIC). 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Probability to engage in NRM investment 
The first stage of the analysis consisted in defining the determinants of communities’ 
decision to undertake NRM investment. Using Probit analysis, we estimate equation [1] 
with stone bunds construction and reforestation as our dependent variables. Results are 
reported in the first column of tables 2 and 3. First, we note that cooperative capacity 
does increase the probability that communities undertake public goods provision; 
implementation capacity being statistically significant in both equations, and network 
capacity being statistically significant in the reforestation equation.  We hypothesized that 
in villages where PSB/GTZ has a presence, there would be a greater probability of 
community-level decisions to provide public goods; in estimated equations we include 
dummies that capture the different length of time PSB/GTZ has been active in the 
communities to allow for different effects due to accumulated experience and different 
paradigms influencing project implementation.  Experience with PSB/GTZ increases the 
probability that a community will undertake stone bund construction for all three time 
periods capturing the length of tie PSB/GTZ has operated within the community as 
compared to control villages; for reforestation, only those villages where PSB/GTZ has 
operated between 1996 and 1999 have a higher probability of engaging in reforestation 
activities.   
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 Communities whose land is mostly allocated to cropping activities are more likely 
to get involved in NRM investments as expected. The land market dummy, which 
captures resource scarcity, has no statistically significant effect, nor does the region or the 
water points for reforestation. Among demographic variables, education and long term 
migration favors SB, but has no effect on reforestation. On the other hand, presence of 
“outsiders” accessing community decreases the probability of SB construction and 
reforestation.  
 
5.2. Explaining communities efficiency in public good provision  
Based on equation [2], we run a cross-sectional stochastic frontier model  to obtain 
measures of inefficiency in reforestation and stone bunds construction. Average 
efficiency level are reported in table 4 in annex, with other descriptive statistics. 
Communities are more efficient in stone bunds construction (technical efficiency of 67%)  
than in reforestation (45%).   
 Once efficiency is measured, we are explaining differences observed between 
communities. We estimate equation [3] with OLS using two scenario: 1) we introduce 
cooperative capacity index as explanatory variables, 2) we use the participation rate 
instead of the cooperation variables. Results are reported in the last two columns of tables 
2 and 3.  
Regarding the effect of cooperation on efficiency, results show that network 
capacity has a negative impact on the reforestation efficiency - greater networks, i.e. 
more organizations and membership in the community and less efficient is the 
reforestation work - and the participation rate has a negative impact on SB construction. 
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The first result can be interpreted as a coordination problem when too many 
organizations are in charge of NRM in the community and when NRM activities are 
organized by more than one organization. The current institutional changes that are 
taking place in the region with the creation of CVGT (village committee for territory 
management), which mandate is to coordinate NRM at the village and inter-village level 
(GRAF, 2003, p.22), could reduce this weakness and result in greater efficiency in the 
provision of investments. The second result is quite surprising, one interpretation could 
be that the closest the participation rate is from 100% and the greater probability the 
group includes less motivated participant that might reduce the average labor 
productivity.   
Table 2: Engagement in stone bunds construction and efficiency in provision
Cooperation
INC 1.713 1.5 * -0.016 -0.1  
IIC 1.060 2.3 *** -0.155 -0.6  
Labor participation rate -0.187 -1.8 **
PSB/GTZ
Villages before 1996 0.440 2.0 ***
Villages 1996-99 0.648 3.1 ***
Villages 2000 0.413 2.1 ***
Land characteristics
% Cropland 0.566 1.6 *
Oudalan region 0.173 0.9  
Land market 0.115 0.6  0.119 2.3 *** 0.152 2.9 ***
Demography
% Education 0.951 3.5 *** 0.087 1.1  0.087 1.2  
% Outsiders -1.276 -2.7 *** -0.415 -1.2  -0.291 -0.9  
% Long term migration 0.682 1.5 * -0.125 -0.4  0.026 0.2  
Activity specific
Experience 0.002 2.5 *** 0.003 2.9 ***
Mills ratio -0.103 -1.3  -0.130 -1.7 **
Constant 0.714 2.7 *** 0.708 7.0 ***
R2 0.510 0.46 0.51
Probit estimation for the selection equation, OLS estimation for the selection equations
Number of observations: 78 (selection), 39 (efficiency)
* (**) (***) Indicates coefficient significant at more than 85% (90%) (95%).
Selection Efficiency (1) Efficiency (2)
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The presence of land market in the community boosts efficiency in SB construction, 
which is done on private land, whereas it has negative but not significant impact on 
reforestation which has a greater public component. Surprisingly, water availability plays 
against efficient reforestation. Demography variables are not playing in both equations, 
except for long term migration that induces more reforestation efficiency. Past experience 
in the provision of the good is valuable in the case of erosion control only.  
Table 2: Engagement in reforestation and efficiency in provision
Cooperation
INC 0.806 1.9 ** -1.679 -2.4 ***  
IIC 1.247 3.4 *** 0.588 0.8  
Labor participation rate -0.188 -0.7
PSB/GTZ  
Villages before 1996 0.251 1.3   
Villages 1996-99 0.256 1.5 *
Villages 2000 -0.025 -0.1  
Land characteristics
% Cropland 0.464 1.5 *
Oudalan region 0.060 0.5  
Land market -0.145 -1.1  -0.187 -1.3  -0.118 -0.8  
Water points 0.029 1.0  -0.071 -2.6 *** -0.048 -1.7 **
Demography
% Education 0.253 1.2  0.279 1.4  0.126 0.6  
% Outsiders -1.659 -1.9 ** 0.321 0.2  1.056 0.7  
% Long term migration -0.048 -0.1  1.721 2.2 *** 0.053 0.1  
Activity specific
Experience -0.002 -0.3  0.007 0.1
Mills ratio -0.239 -1.2  -1.179 -0.9  
Constant 0.601 0.9  0.858 2.4 ***
R2 0.37 0.450 0.300
Probit estimation for the selection equation, OLS estimation for the selection equations
Number of observations: 78 (selection), 30 (efficiency)
* (**) (***) Indicates coefficient significant at more than 85% (90%) (95%).
Selection Efficiency (1) Efficiency (2)
 
Finally, selection bias is occurring in scenario 2 of the SB equation, with a negative 
coefficient for the Mills ratio, suggesting as expected that villages that engaged erosion 
control activity are more likely to be efficient.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper is an analysis about the importance of collective action for the realization of 
Natural Resource Management (NRM) investments and also on its potential side effect 
on efficiency. The analysis is based on survey data that were collected in 2002 in 78 
villages of northeastern Burkina Faso. Community involvement decision in soil erosion 
control and in reforestation is first analysed and efficiency in the realization of these 
investment is measured and explained using exogenous factors. The general cooperative 
capacity of each community is first recovered for any type of collective activity and then, 
is successfully used to explain the probability for a community to get involved in specific 
NRM investments. However, network capacity has a negative impact on reforestation 
efficiency, suggesting than a better coordination between the multiple NRM organization  
of the village is necessary. The recent creation of the CVGT should solve this matter.  
In parallel, we show that more participants in collective work leads to a lower 
efficient rate. A better understanding of the rules of the work organization and the 
expectations in members behaviors could help clarify this issue, and therefore help to 
define institutional arrangements that can be put in place in order to avoid this ‘waste’ of 
volunteer work.   
 
 
 
 
 
 19
REFERENCES 
 
 
Baland, J.M., and J.P. Platteau, 1997. Wealth inequality and efficiency in the Commons. 
Part I: The unregulated case. Oxford Economic Papers 49: 415-482.   
 
Banzhaf, M., B. Drabo and H. Grell. 2000. Du conflit au consensus. Securing the 
Commons 3, IIED, SOS Sahel, PSB/GTZ. 
 
Bardhan, P. 1993. Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural 
development. World Development, (21) 4: 633-639. 
 
Barry, H., 1996. Les conflits liés à l’exploitation des ressources pastorales au Sahel 
Burkinabé. Rapport d’étude. PSB/GTZ – PSB/ Pays –Bas / PRASET. 
 
Berkes F. and C. Folke.  1998.  Linking social and ecological systems:  Management 
practices and social mechanisms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dasgupta, P. and I. Serageldin. 2000. Social capital: A multifaceted perspective.  
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
 
de Janvry, A., N. McCarthy and E. Sadoulet.  1998.   Endogenous provision and 
cooperation on the commons.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 80: 
658-664.  
 
Drabo, B. and, C. Dutilly-Diane. 2001. Institutions, collective action and natural 
resources use in the Burkinabe Sahel. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for the Management of 
Rangelands in Dry Areas, CAPRi, ICARDA, ILRI. 
 
Drabo, B., H. Grell, and A. Poda. 2001. Gestion concertée des ressources 
agropastorales : cas du Sahel Burkinabé. PSB/GTZ. 
 
Dutilly-Diané, C. 2001. Action collective et coopération partielle dans la gestion des 
ressources communes: Le cas des ejidos mexicains. Ph.D Dissertation. CERDI, 
Université d’Auvergne. 
 
Dutilly-Diane, C., E. Sadoulet, and A. de Janvry. 2003. Household Behavior Under 
Market Failures: How Natural Resoruce Management in Agriculture Promotes 
Livestock Production in the Sahel. Journal of African Economies 12(3): 341-368. 
 
Fafchamps, Marcel. 1999. The tragedy of the commons, livestock cycles and 
sustainability. Journal of African Economies 7(3): 384-423. 
 
 20
GRAF. 2003. Enjeux et viabilité des communes rurales au Burkina Faso. Royal Tropical 
Institute, Amsterdam, Bulletin n° 351. 
http://www.kit.nl/publishers/assets/images/isbn9068328409_compleet.pdf 
 
Grootaert, C., GT. Oh, and A. Swamy. 1999. The local level institutions study: Social 
capital and development outcomes in Burkina Faso. Local Level Institutions 
Working Paper No.7. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
Hardin, G. 1968.  The tragedy of the Commons’. Science, 162:1243-8. 
 
Kambou, B., 1997. Etude sur la gestion alternative des conflits. Résultats des enquêtes 
dans la zone d’intervention du PSB/GTZ. Rapport ; Dori. 
 
Krishna, A.  2001.  Moving from the stock of social capital to the flow of benefits: The 
role of agency.  World Development 29(6): 925-943.  
 
McCarthy, N. 1999.  An economic analysis of the effects of production risk on the use 
and management of common-pool rangelands.  In Property rights, risk and 
livestock development in Africa, ed. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk and P. 
Hazell.  Nairobi and Washington, D.C.: International Livestock Research Institute 
and International Food Policy Research Institute.   
 
McCarthy, N., Sadoulet, E. and de Janvry, A.  1998.  Land allocation under dual 
individual-collective use in Mexico.  J. Dev. Ec. 56:239-264.  
 
McCarthy, N., and C. Dutilly-Diane. 2002. Collective Action and Natural Resource 
Management: An Application to Northeastern Burkina Faso. Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute.  Mimeo. 
 
Ouédraogo, H., 2001. Commentaries in Workshop summary international conference on 
policy and institutional options for the management of rangelands in dry areas, 
CAPRi, ICARDA, ILRI. 
 
Ouédraogo, H., 1991. Le régime foncier dans le Sahel Burkinabé. UNSO/BFF. 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.  
 
Olson, M. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective 
action. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pennings J. M.E. and R. M. Leuthold. 2000. The role of farmer’s behavioral attitudes and 
heterogeneity in futures contracts usage. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, (82) 4: 908-919. 
 
 21
Poteete, Amy. 2000. Strategies for regulating use of forest resources: How exclusive? 
Bloomington: International Forestry Resources and Institutions, Indiana 
University.  Mimeo. 
 
PSB/GTZ, 1999. Une expérience de gestion alternative des conflits fonciers . Edition 
JADE .Collections  Paroles Terriennes. Ouagadougou. 
 
Seabright P. 1994.  Is cooperation habit-forming ? In The Environment and Emerging 
Development Issues, ed. P. Dasgupta. and K.G. Maler. Oxford:  Clarendon Press.  
 
Wade R., 1987. Village republics: Economic conditions for collective action in South 
India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
ANNEX 
 
Table 4. Variables description
Variables Nb obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Efficiency 
Stone bunds 39 0.669 0.158 0.348 0.919
Reforestation 31 0.446 0.285 0.077 0.973
Cooperative capacity
INC 78 0.179 0.148 0 1
IIC 78 0.654 0.203 0 1
PSB-GTZ
Before 1996 78 0.256 0.439 0 1
1996-99 78 0.218 0.416 0 1
Demography
% Education 78 0.293 0.324 0 1
% Outsiders 78 0.093 0.218 0 1
% Long term migration 78 0.097 0.126 0 0.846
Community land
Land market 78 0.295 0.459 0 1
% Cropland 78 0.417 0.206 0.063 0.902
Water points 78 4.01 2.07 1 10
Stone bunds specific
Past treated area 39 21.19 24.91 0 135
Support by PSB-GTZ 39 0.897 0.307 0 1
Participation rate 39 0.770 0.242 0.095 1
Distance to stones 39 9.64 11.05 1 50
Reforestation specific
Experience (Nb years) 30 11.20 7.37 1 30
Support by PSB-GTZ 31 0.839 0.374 0 1
Participation rate 31 0.752 0.213 0.143 1  
